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Water Law-The Effect of Acts of the Sovereign
on the Pueblo Rights Doctrine in New Mexico*
The pueblo rights doctrine provides generally that a city, town,
or village has a prior right to take all the water of a non-navigable
stream for the use of its inhabitants. This right is prior and superior
to all other claims. The rationale is that the pueblos were established in uninhabited regions before the arrival of any riparian settlers or other appropriators.' California was first to recognize pueblo
rights. 2 It was the first state created out of the territory acquired
from Mexico by the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, and it was there
that the law of waters first became important enough to be the subject of adjucation.
In Cartwrightv. Public Serv. Co.,3 suit was filed alleging that the
defendant company was interfering with the plaintiffs' water rights
which had accrued to them as prior users. The defendant offered an
1835 grant of pueblo rights made to its predecessors by the Republic of Mexico as an affirmative defense. The trial court upheld the
defense and dismissed the action. On appeal to the Supreme Court
of New Mexico, held, affirmed.4
In this opinion, adopting the pueblo rights doctrine, the Court said:
We are unable to avoid the conclusion that the reasons which
brought the Supreme Court of California to uphold and enforce the

Pueblo Rights doctrine apply with as much force in New Mexico as
they do in California. A new, undeveloped and unoccupied territory
was being settled. There were no questions of priority of use when a
colonization pueblo was established because there were no such users.
Water formed the life blood of the community or settlement, not only

in its origin but as it grew and expanded. A group of fifty families at
the founding of a colony found it no more so than when their number
was multiplied to hundreds or even thousands in an orderly, progressive growth.
And just as in the case of a private user, so long as he proceeds with
due dispatch to reduce to beneficial use the larger area to which his
permit entitles him, enjoys a priority for the whole, so by analogy and
Cartwright v. Public Service Co. of New Mexico, 66 N.M. 64, 343 P.2d 654 (1959).
1. 1 S. Wiel, Water Rights in the Western States 68, 69 (3rd Ed. 1911).
2. Lux v. Haggin, 69 Cal. 255, 4 P. 919 (1884).
3. 66 N.M. 64, 343 P.2d 654 (1959).
4. A second suit was brought as a continuation of the first under N.M. Stat. Ann.
§ 23-1-14 (1953) alleging that the grant was made to the "Town of Las Vegas Grant"
rather than to the "Town of Las Vegas" as had been determined in the first suit. The
Supreme Court of New Mexico upheld the dismissal of the action in the first case and
held that the continuation statute did not apply because judgment on the merits had been
rendered. Cartwright v. Public Serv. Co., 68 N.M. 418, 362 P.2d 796 (1961).
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under the rationale of the Pueblo Rights doctrine, the settlers who
founded a colonization pueblo, in the process of growth and expansion,
carried with them the torch of priority, so long as there was available
water to supply the life blood of the expanded community. There is
present in the doctrine discussed the recognizable presence of lex suprema, the police power, which furnishes answer to claims of confiscation always present when private and public rights or claims collide.
• . .So, here, we see in the Pueblo Rights doctrine the elevation of
5
the public good over the claim of a private right.

New Mexico is commonly regarded as a prior appropriation state.
In Martinez v. Cook' the Supreme Court of New Mexico said, "Particularly, we have never followed it [the common law] in connection
with our waters, but, on the contrary, have followed the Mexican or
civil law, and what is called the Colorado doctrine of prior appro7
priation and beneficial use ;" and in State v. Red River Valley Co.,
"All of our unappropriated waters from 'every natural stream,
perennial or torrential, within the state of New Mexico' Art. 16,
Sec. 2, Const., are public waters. These waters belong to the public
until beneficially appropriated."
The pioneers emphasized the acquisition of individual rights in
water. Because of the arid conditions they settled near streams or
springs where water was available when needed. They applied the
law of capture to water, which evolved into the doctrine of prior
appropriation.' Today the claims of appropriators exceed the normal
flow on nearly all of the streams in New Mexico.
There are cities and towns in New Mexico which were originally
established as Spanish colonial pueblos." They resembled the municipalities in Spain. The land was considered part of the royal domain,
and the laws were declared by the central government. 10 The grants
were not in fee simple. Rather, they were guarantees of perpetual
use and "the king could maintain a right to allow the occupation of
these towns by his own decree, although the town could not."'"
Initially, in the colonization of New Spain, the king, by special
ordinance, provided the customary four leagues of land and the
water flowing to it for the use of each new pueblo and its inhabitants.
However, in 1789 the town of Pitic (or Pictic) was established in
Sonora under general regulations which the king ordered to be fol5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

Cartwright v. Public Serv. Co., 66 N.M. 64 at 85, 343 P.2d 654, 668-69 (1959).
56 N.M. 343 at 349, 244 P.2d 134, 138 (1952).
51 N.M. 207 at 222, 182 P.2d 421, 430 (194-5).
R. Clark, New Mexico Water Resources Law 2 (1964).
1 C. Kinney, Irrigation and Water Rights 994 (2d ed. 1912).
F. Blackmar, Spanish Institutions of the Southwest 160 (1891).

11. Id. at 168-69.
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lowed in the foundation of all new pueblos in the internal Provinces
of the West. That territory included the present states of California,
Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas. The regulations were known as
the Plan of Pitic which stated:
The neighbors and natives shall likewise enjoy the use of the
woods, water, and other benefits from the royal and vacant lands
lying outside of the tract assigned to the new town, jointly with
the residents and natives of the immediate and adjoining towns; which

favor and right shall continue until by His Majesty the same shall
be granted or alienated; in which case regulations will be made according to the provisions for concessions in favor of new possessors or
12
proprietors.

Will the pueblo rights doctrine be applied throughout New Mexico? Professor Clark 3 has suggested it is not very likely because
many of the river towns were established as pueblos before 1789
and, therefore, cannot rely upon the provisions of the Plan of Pitic
to assert pueblo rights." 4 However, in Albuquerque v. Reynolds 5
the trial court held that Albuquerque was originally established as
a pueblo on the Rio Grande River and "has a right to take whatever water it may need, and as the city expands, the added needs for
present and future times." The Supreme Court of New Mexico reversed the judgment, but on other grounds.
The decision in the Cartwright case has enabled the City of Las
Vegas to take water from persons who have been appropriating
from the Gallinas River for many years. If other cities and towns
with pueblo origins assert pueblo rights on the various streams
throughout the state, the injury to farmers and other appropriators
would be severe.
The issue is not whether the towns may take the water they need,
but whether they must compensate the current users. The towns may
take the water by eminent domain but only upon payment of just
compensation. If, however, they take the water under the doctrine
of pueblo rights, the "presence of lex suprema" enables them to do
so without paying for it.1 6
12. 1 C. Kinney, supra note 9, at 995; State v. Tularosa Community Ditch, 19 N.M.
352 at 377, 143 P, 207, 216 (1914).
13. Professor of Law, University of Arizona.
14. Clark, The Pueblo Rights Doctrine in New Mexico, 35 New Mexico Historical
Rev. 265, 276-77 (1960).
15. 71 N.M. 428, 379 P.2d 73 (1962).
16. Ellis, Water Provisions of the New Mexico Constitution, Proposed Constitution
and Comment 2 (1967), in Report of the Constitutional Revision Commission 182
(1967).
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The majority opinion in the Cartwright decision stated that the
police power "furnishes answer to claims of confiscation always
present when private and public rights or claims collide. .

.

. So,

here, we see in the Pueblo Rights doctrine the elevation of the public
good over the claim of a private right."'1 7 This is in line with the
approach taken by courts throughout the nation in denying compensation to private citizens who have suffered losses resulting from
appropriations by government."8 It appears on its face, however, to
ignore "justice," if one defines "justice" as "fairness."
Professor Michelman 9 argues that "the only 'test' for compensability which is 'correct' in the sense of being directly responsive to
society's purpose in engaging in a compensation practice is the test
of fairness: . . . [A]nd that its most important immediate impli-

cation for public policy pertains to the assignment of responsibility
for ensuring that compensation is paid whenever it ought to be." 2 °
On the other hand, Professor Sax 2 applies the rule: "[W]-hen an
individual or limited group in society sustains a detriment to legally
acquired existing economic values as a consequence of government
activity which enhances the economic value of some governmental
enterprise, then the act is a taking, and compensation is constitutionally required; but when the challenged act is an improvement
of the public condition through resolution of conflict within the
private sector of the society, compensation is not constitutionally
required."22
Should Michelman's "fairness" and "public policy" be considered,
the court might find that compensation should be paid. But, in essence, the Cartwright opinion applies the Sax test, which brings us
to the paramount issue: Since pueblo rights are prior and superior
to those of other users, what are the nature and extent of the rights
which have vested in the pueblo under the doctrine? Are they limitable? Are they extinguishable? Have they been limited? Have they
been extinguished?
The Spanish have never regarded running water in natural streams
as property. No one, not even the government, could own the corpus
of the water. Spanish water law, as under the civil law, considered
17. See text accompanying note 5 supra.
18. There is no exact definition of the term police power. It is traditionally applied
by the courts to protect the health, safety, and morals of the community. See Sax,
Taking and the Police Power, 74 Yale L.J. 36 (1964).
19. Professor of Law, Harvard Law School.
20. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 1165, 1171-72 (1967).
21. Professor of Law, University of Michigan.
22. Sax, supra note 18, at 67.
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natural running water to be res communes.2 3 Therefore, if any water
right vested in the pueblos, it was only to the use of the water.
Spain considered the colonial territories in America to be part
of the mother country. Her motivation for colonizing New Spain
was to expand the royal domain. The possession of all new land was
vested in the Crown. The king controlled all colonial power and
policy; all rights flowed directly from him. The settlers had no rights
nor political power.2 4 The sovereign always maintained close control
over the rights to use the land and its resources. The pueblos were
under constant supervision by officers of the government. No grants
of land were ever made to them, and the government officers could
suspend, restrict, or enlarge the powers of the pueblos.25
The grants made to the pueblos were for the perpetual use of the
land and its resources, not grants in fee, and "the king could maintain a right to allow the occupation of these towns by his own decree,
although the town could not."' 26 The Plan of Pitic provided for the
use of the land and its resources, including the water, "which favor
and right shall continue until by His Majesty the same shall be
granted or alienated; in which case regulations will be made according
to the provisions for concessions in favor of new possessors or
proprietors. ' 27 Los Angeles was founded as a pueblo under Neve's
Reglamento which similarly provided:
The residents and natives shall enjoy equally the woods, pastures,
water privileges, and other advantages of the royal and vacant lands
that may be outside of the lands assigned to the new settlement, in
common with the residents and natives of the adjoining and neighboring pueblos, which bounty and privilege shall continue as long as they
are not changed or altered by His Majesty, in which case they shall
conform to that which has been provided in the Royal orders that may
be issued in favor of the new possessors or owners. 28

Thus, the right to use land and its resources in New Spain was
granted on conditions that rendered the right limitable and extinguishable.
The colonies of New Spain revolted in 1821, banished the officers
of the Spanish Crown, and created the United States of Mexico.
The rights to the use of land and water established by the king were
recognized by the Mexican Government, which retained the power
23.
24.
25.
26.

1 C. Kinney, supra note 9, at 468, 989.
F. Blackmar, supra note 10, at 51.
1 C. Kinney, supra note 9, at 994-95.
See note 11 supra and accompanying text.

27. See note 12 supra and accompanying text.
28. J. Dwinelle, The Colonial History of the City of San Francisco, Addenda No.

IV at 5 (1924) ; quoted in V. Ostrom, Water and Politics 32 (1953).
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to establish by law the terms, conditions, and limitations of the use. 9
Later, Texas revolted against the Mexican Government, declared
its independence, and eventually was annexed by the United States of
America. This precipitated war between the United States and Mexico which ended in the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo in 1848. The
territory, now comprising the states of California, Nevada, Utah,
and most of Arizona and New Mexico, was ceded to the United
States. The remainder of the present states of Arizona and New
Mexico was acquired in 1853 by the Gadsden Purchase.
The United States annexed this land with the pueblo rights in full
force. 3 The transfer involved simply a change of sovereign, not a
change of right.3' The United States Government, as the new sovereign, has made it clear on several occasions that the power to determine the rules controlling the use of water is vested in the states. 2
In Section 9 of the Act of 1866, Congress protected vested water
rights which were recognized by the local customs, laws, and de3
cisions of the courts.
The amending Act of 1870 provided that patents granted for
federal land were subject to all existing or subsequently acquired
34
rights as protected in the Act of 1866.
Congress passed the Desert Land Act in 1877. It applied to California, Oregon, Nevada and the then territories of Washington,
Idaho, Montana, Utah, Wyoming, Arizona, New Mexico, and
Dakota. Its principal purpose was to reclaim desert land on the
public domain, but its provisions were also subject to existing
rights. 3 In 1935 the U.S. Supreme Court, in construing this act,
said: "What we hold is that following the Act of 1877, if not before, all non-navigable waters then a part of the public domain became publici juris, subject to the plenary control of the designated
states, including those since created out of the territories named.
,,36

29. 1 C. Kinney, supra note 9, at 990.
30. Id.
31. 1 C. Kinney, supra note 9, at 1003. "The law governing waters in Mexico was
always subject to Government control, and by the transfer of the title of these lands
to this country, through which these waters flow, there was simply a change of sovereign and not a change of right. . . . [I]t is left entirely to the States and Territories
formed out of the lands acquired from Mexico to adopt whatever rule as to waters
they may see fit. ..."
32. California Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 295 U.S. 142,
162-64 (1935).
33. 14 Stat. 253 § 9 (1866).
34. 16 Stat. 218 § 17 (1870).
35. 19 Stat. 377 § 1 (1877).
36. California Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 295 U.S. 142,
163-64 (1935).
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There are other statutes in which Congress has recognized the
rights of the states to control the laws of water within their own
borders, including section 8 of the Reclamation Act,' 7 section 18 of
the Boulder Canyon Project Act, 8 and section 1 of the Flood Control Act of 1944.3
By way of the Mexican Government and the United States Government, New Mexico has succeeded to the sovereignty of the Spanish Crown with respect to the water within its borders. "All water
within the state, whether above or beneath the surface of the ground
belongs to the state, which authorizes its use, and there is no ownership in the corpus of the water but the use thereof may be acquired
and the basis of such acquisition is beneficial use. . . -4o The right
reserved by the royal government of Spain to grant or alienate and
to make new regulations concerning the use of the water in favor of
new possessors 4 ' may be exercised by the sovereign government of
New Mexico. Has the legislature exercised this right with respect to
pueblo rights?
The Kearny Code of 1846 protected the existing uses of water
without specifically mentioning the appropriation doctrine or pueblo
rights.42 It was established by the commander of the U.S. troops
occupying the land prior to the legal cession of the territory to the
United States in the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo in 1848.
The New Mexico Water Code 43 was enacted in 1907. It declared
the existing law as it had been judicially established.44 The New
Mexico Constitution, adopted in 1911, embraced the provisions of
the Water Code in Article XVI.
Section 1 confirmed the existing rights: "All existing rights to the
use of any waters in this state for any useful or beneficial purpose
are hereby recognized and confirmed." This recognized the rights
of pueblos to divert water, at least to the extent that they actually
had put the water to beneficial use. The expanding right, the right
to future use of a greater quantity of the water as the pueblos grew,
was neither confirmed nor denied explicitly. However, in the opinion
of the Attorney General, ".

.

. only those rights to the use of

waters are recognized and confirmed in which the waters are applied
37. 43 U.S.C. §§ 372, 383 (1952).
38. 43 U.S.C. § 617(q) (1952).
39. 33 U.S.C. § 701-1 (1952).
40. State ex rel. Erickson v. McLean, 62 N.M. 264 at 271, 308 P.2d 983, 987 (1957).
41. See note 12 supra and accompanying text.
42. See Kearny Code, Watercourses, Stock Marks, Etc., N.M. Stat. Ann. § 1 at 360
(1953).
43. N.M. Laws 1907, eh. 49.
44. Hagerman Irr. Co. v. McMurray, 16 N.M. 172, 113 P. 823 (1911); Yeo v.
Tweedy, 34 N.M. 611, 286 P. 970 (1929).
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to a useful or beneficial purpose. Rights to waters not used for such
purposes, if there are any such rights, are not recognized or confirmed. ' 45 Under this interpretation, any rights of pueblos to future
appropriations were revoked by the sovereign.
Section 2 stated:
The unappropriated water of every natural stream, perennial or
torrential, within the state of New Mexico, is hereby declared to belong to the public and to be subject to appropriation for beneficial
use, in accordance with the laws of the state. Priority of appropriation
shall give the better right.
This declared all unappropriated water to be subject to appropriation for beneficial use. Clearly, that quantity of water which had already been applied to beneficial use by the pueblos was confirmed
as an existing right. The pueblos, having settled uninhabited regions,
46
had appropriated the water prior in time to any private claimants.
The pueblos, therefore, are senior appropriators today.
But what effect has this section on any claim to future applications
to beneficial use under the expanding theory of the pueblo rights
doctrine? The answer requires construing the term "appropriation."
When has appropriation been accomplished?
In Snow v. Abalos,47 the Supreme Court of New Mexico said:
The intention to apply to beneficial use, the diversion works, and
the actual diversion of the water necessarily all precede the application of the water to the use intended, but it is the application of the
water, or the intent to apply, followed with due diligence toward application and ultimate application, which gives to the appropriator
the continued and continuous right to take the water. All the steps
precedent to actual application are but preliminary to the same, and
designed to consummate the actual application. Without such prece-

dent steps no application could be made, but it is the application to a
beneficial use which gives the continuing right to divert and utilize
the water.

Under this construction of the doctrine of appropriation, it is apparent that in incorporating this section in the Constitution, the
legislature has limited the rights of the pueblos to take only that
amount of water that they were diverting in 1911. Any subsequent
appropriations are junior to all others prior in time, including those
granted under the pueblo rights doctrine, and take effect as of the
date of the diversion.
45. [1915-1916] N.M. Att'y Gen. Rep. no. 1508.
46. 1 S. Wiel, supra note 1.
47. 18 N.M. 681 at 694; 140 P. 1044, 1048 (1914).
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The opinion in Snow v. Abalos does permit the relation back doctrine to come in to establish a previous date of appropriation where
intent to apply the water to beneficial use can be established. But
although the intent to apply may have been present in 1911, due
for expanded population
diligence is not satisfied simply by 4waiting
8
to increase the needs of the pueblos.
Section 3 stated: "Beneficial use shall be the basis, the measure
and the limit of the right to the use of water." This section also limits
the rights of the pueblos to that amount of water which they were
applying to beneficial use in 1911. The Attorney General stated this
very clearly in interpreting the section:
By limiting the right to the use of water to a "beneficial use", our
Constitution grants to the appropriator only that quantity of water
which is so applied, the remainder being subject to further appropriation for like purpose.

An appropriator acquires a vested right only to that quantity of
water which he appropriates to a beneficial use, and he cannot be
to complain if application is made for the use of the surplus
heard 49
water.

The Constitution makes no exceptions in favor of the rights of
pueblos. It is difficult to see how the court could infer from the Constitution an intention of the framers to except the pueblos. Such intention is not implied at all. Even if the court could infer that a
pueblo rights exception was intended, the sovereign has subsequently
acted to limit the rights of appropriators, again without excepting
the pueblos.
New Mexico participates in seven river compacts. The legislature
has ratified agreements with other riparian states for the apportionment of the waters of the Canadian River, the Colorado, the Upper
Colorado, Costilla Creek, the La Plata, the Pecos, and the Rio
Grande."0
New Mexico District Judge Federici pointed out, in his lengthy
dissent in the Cartwrightcase, 5 ' that Article IX of the Pecos River
Compact provides: "In maintaining the flows at the New MexicoTexas state line required by this compact, New Mexico shall in all
instances apply the principle of prior appropriation within New
Mexico." 52 But more important to establishing the ratifications of
the river compacts as acts of the sovereign which limit the water
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Rio Puerco Irr. Co. v. Jastro, 19 N.M. 149 at 153, 141 P. 874, 876 (1914).
N.M. Att'y Gen. Rep., supra note 45.
R. Clark, supra note 8, at 70; N.M. Star. Ann. § 75-34-3 (Supp. 1963).
Cartwright v. Public Serv. Co., 66 N.M. 64 at 100, 343 P.2d 654, 679 (1959).
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 75-34-3 (1953).
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rights of the pueblos is the effect of the requirement placed upon
the state in each compact to deliver a certain quantity of water to
the lower riparian state. The compacts bind not only the states but
also the citizens of the states and, thereby, may alter or limit the
rights of private users. Pueblo rights, along with other private
53
water rights, are thus subject to limitation.
Clark takes the position that the compacts are inferior to the
rights of appropriators. 4 But the Supreme Court of the United
States in Hinderliderv. La PlataRiver and Cherry Creek Ditch Co.
ruled that "the apportionment is binding upon the citizens of each
State and all water claimants, even where the State had granted
water rights before it entered into the compact."5 5 The Supreme
Court also approved the provision in the La Plata River Compact
that the water could be "rotated between the two States in such
manner, for such periods, and to continue for such time as the state
engineers may jointly determine." 5 Thus, the compacts may limit
the rights of the pueblos and, at times, may administratively suspend
those rights.
The Supreme Court of New Mexico has followed the lead of the
California courts in affirming the rights of a pueblo "to the use of
so much of the water . . . as should be necessary for the pueblo
and its inhabitants, including the future growth and expansion of
said pueblo. ' 5 7 It applied the doctrine of pueblo rights and ruled
properly that a municipality with Spanish-Mexican pueblo origin
succeeded to all the rights in land and water acquired by the old
pueblo.
However, in pointing to the Plan of Pitic as the foundation of
pueblo rights, it failed to recognize the reservation by the sovereign
of the right to change or alienate the privilege. The government of
New Mexico has not only succeeded to that sovereign reservation
but has exercised it. The effect of the provisions in the New Mexico
Constitution was the cancellation of any rights to increase the
amount of water to be appropriated in the future to satisfy the expanding needs of the growing pueblos. The ratification of the river
compacts generally affect the pueblos situated on those rivers, not
only by confirming the cancellation of any expanding water rights,
but also by technically limiting or suspending the rights in favor of
53. King, Interstate Water Compacts, Water Resources and the Law 355, 372
(1958).
54. Clark, supra note 14, at 278.
55. 304 U.S. 92, 106 (1937).
56. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 75-34-3 (1953).
57. Cartwright v. Public Serv. Co. of New Mexico, 66 N.M. 64 at 68, 343 P.2d 654,
657 (1959).
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the rights of the lower riparian states which are parties to the
compacts.
The pueblos are senior appropriators. Their rights to continue
to appropriate that amount of water which was applied to beneficial
use before the appropriations by private users is clearly affirmed.
But all subsequent increases in the amount of water appropriated
take effect as of the date of application to beneficial use and are
junior to the rights of all prior appropriations, whether by pueblos
or by private users. Since nearly all of the streams in New Mexico
are "over-appropriated", the pueblo towns are going to have to
condemn existing appropriation rights of private users under the
power of eminent domain in order to meet the needs of their expanding populations. Just compensation must be paid for the taking
of that water.
JEFFERSON

E. LECATES

